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A. INTRODUCTION 
Abortions are potentially illegal under Scots common law unless they meet the criteria set down in 
the Abortion Act 1967: namely that they are performed by a registered medical practitioner on specific 
medical grounds, and in an approved location. Section 1(3) of the Act lists various types of hospital as 
approved locations and authorises Ministers to approve individual locations on a case-by-case basis. 
Section 1(3A), inserted by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, allows Ministers to 
approve a “class of places”. 
On 26 October 2017, exercising their section 1(3A) powers, the Scottish Ministers approved “[t]he 
home of a pregnant woman who is undergoing treatment for the purposes of termination of her 
pregnancy”.1 The home was interpreted as “the place in Scotland where a pregnant woman is 
ordinarily resident”.2 So-called medical or pharmaceutical abortion is achieved through taking, first, 
the feticide mifepristone and, a day or so later, misoprostol to evacuate the pregnancy. The Approval 
allowed the taking of misoprostol at home where: the woman has been prescribed both medications 
at a clinic, has taken mifepristone there, and has expressed desire to take misoprostol at home.3 
The Approval is unpublished by the Scottish Government. It was circulated to health boards and like 
institutions by the Government’s Chief Medical Officer along with Guidance for the Approval’s 
implementation which had been prepared by the Scottish Abortion Care Providers Network.4 That 
Guidance comprised “inclusion criteria” for consideration by doctors when deciding whether to allow 
home abortion, a list of medical conditions which would prevent home abortion, and a detailed 
procedural check list for the doctor to follow in home abortion cases. 
The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC) challenged the lawfulness of this Approval 
by a judicial review action, which was heard in the Court of Session’s Outer House by Lady Wise in 
May 2018. She rendered judgment on 15 August 2018 in favour of the Scottish Ministers.5 The 
importance of her decision extends beyond Scotland: England will implement home abortion on the 
Scottish model following the decision;6 Wales has already done so.7 The SPUC has appealed and the 
case has progressed to the Inner House.8  
                                                          
1 Abortion Act 1967 (Place for Treatment for the Termination of Pregnancy) (Approval) (Scotland) 2017, para 3. 
2 Ibid para 2. 
3 Ibid para 4. 
4 Scottish Abortion Care Providers Network, “Early Medical Abortion at home up to 9 weeks + 6 Days gestation 
(EMAH): Guidelines for early medical abortion with self-administration of misoprostol in the home setting”, 
available at https://www.sehd.scot.nhs.uk/cmo/CMO(2017)14.pdf.  
5 Society for the Protection of Unborn Children v Scottish Ministers [2018] CSOH 85. 
6 Department of Health and Social Care, “Government confirms plans to approve the home-use of early abortion 
pills”, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-confirms-plans-to-approve-the-home-
use-of-early-abortion-pills. 
7 Abortion Act 1967 (Approval of Place for Treatment for the Termination of Pregnancy) (Wales) 2018. 
8 Court of Session Rolls, 12 September, Extra Division of the Inner House. 
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This article analyses the judgment at first instance and submits that its rationale is unsound; this raises 
questions for the UK-wide adoption of the Scottish model. This article also addresses outstanding 
questions about the Approval and Guidance. Significant issues with the legality of the Approval on 
public law grounds are explored by the authors elsewhere.9  
 
B. THE DECISION 
There were two points at issue. First, whether a home is a permissible class of places for the purposes 
of the 1967 Act. Secondly, whether the treatment anticipated in the Approval is performed by a 
registered medical practitioner as required by section 1(1). However, these issues are blurred thus 
resulting in overlap between the corresponding parts of the judgment. Moreover, the Scottish 
Government’s failure to support all of its arguments resulted in Lady Wise’s reasoning becoming 
somewhat remote from the parties’ legal argumentation in places. 10  
Both parties accepted that pregnant women can currently self-administer misoprostol at an approved 
place then immediately leave so that the loss of pregnancy occurs at home.11 Lady Wise also explicitly 
“proceed[ed] on the basis that no issue is taken with the [treatment process] as a safe method to 
terminate pregnancy”.12 
 (1) Pregnant women’s homes as a “class of places” 
The petitioners disputed the lawfulness of pregnant women’s homes as a “class of places” for the 
purposes of section 1(3A), making three interconnected arguments.  
First, that a competent class of places cannot be so broad as to comprise all homes of pregnant women 
undertaking abortion treatment. Places within a class must also be linked by shared features 
unconnected to a user (i.e. the woman).13 Lady Wise determined that the class is “a real and 
substantive restriction on location” because the woman is restricted in that she cannot take the 
medication anywhere other than her home.14 Furthermore, “there is at least a rational basis for 
identifying the place of ordinary residence” because the doctor must know the location where the 
patient will continue the course of treatment.15 
Secondly, applying the reasoning of Lords Diplock and Keith that Parliament’s intention in 1967 was 
to provide for “safe and hygienic” abortion conditions,16 that the Approval must fail because all 
pregnant women’s homes are not necessarily safe and hygienic. While conceding that safety was a 
relevant consideration, the Government suggested that the test was a broader one of “suitability”, 
                                                          
9 R B Taylor and A L M Wilson, “Approving home abortion in the UK: Executive decisions, delegated legislation 
and the rule of law” (forthcoming). 
10 See R B Taylor and A L M Wilson, “Outer House arguments over lawfulness of abortion treatment at home”, 
Scottish Legal News (18 May 2018) available at www.scottishlegal.com/article/judicially-reviewing-the-
lawfulness-of-abortion-treatment-at-home-summary-of-arguments-in-the-outer-house. 
11 SPUC para 34. 
12 Ibid para 29. 
13 Ibid para 12. 
14 Ibid para 31. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid para 9; Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v the Department of Health and Social Security 
[1981] AC 800. 
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also comprising issues such as privacy.17 The Government appears to have drawn this wording from 
the report of Standing Committee F during the passage of the 1967 Act.18  
Lady Wise confirmed that the appropriate test was one of suitability rather than purely safety, 
although she used the terms interchangeably.19 It was unnecessary to show that all pregnant women’s 
homes would be suitable, because this would “underplay that the woman’s wish to take the 
misoprostol at home is an important restriction contained within the approval.”20 It can “be readily 
inferred” that suitability would be considered by the pregnant woman when deciding whether to 
request a home abortion.21 
The petitioner further argued that, because not all homes are safe or suitable, the Government was 
in effect delegating its power to identify and approve places to doctors on a case-by-case basis. Lady 
Wise disputed this, stating that “the approval does not delegate to the medical profession the decision 
on suitability of the home as a class of place.”22 However, the situation is arguably worse than the 
petitioners claimed. Despite suggesting that the doctor has the final medical decision, the corollary of 
the above is that the principal burden of assessing a place’s suitability now rests on the patient. 
Suitability accordingly becomes a subjective test by the patient rather than an objective one by the 
doctor. 
Several further issues arise, beyond those contemplated in court. First, judicial delegation of the 
suitability test to the patient may create a de facto right for the patient to make that determination. 
Such a situation goes beyond the Approval’s wording, which seems to use the woman’s desire for 
home abortion to prevent her from being compelled to take the medication at home rather than in a 
clinic setting, not to give her discretion to make a substantive contribution to the assessment of the 
location’s suitability. This is inconsistent with the 1967 Act, which puts the full evaluative burden on 
the doctor and is widely criticised for limiting patient autonomy thereby.23 Secondly, the patient has 
no framework of reference on which to make a substantive judgment as to suitability because she has 
no practical recourse to the Approval or the Guidance. Thirdly, the Guidance does not direct the doctor 
accurately. The Guidance requires the doctor to determine that there is “[n]o cause for concern 
regarding wellbeing at home”,24 which falls far short of an assessment of suitability. 
Thirdly, through these two interconnected arguments, the petitioners made the wider point that the 
executive’s power to approve a “class of places” was restricted. However, despite stating that the 
place must be suitable, Lady Wise held that: 
[T]here is nothing in the legislation that restricts the classes of place that can be approved to 
those in a similar category to hospitals or clinics. The power to approve a class of place is given 
                                                          
17 SPUC para 19. 
18 Ibid para 17; Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons Official Report: Standing Committee F: Medical 
Termination of Pregnancy Bill, 18 January to 5 April 1967 (London: HMSO 1967). 
19 SPUC para 32. 
20 Ibid para 33. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 See e.g. S Sheldon, “The decriminalisation of abortion: An argument for modernisation” (2016) 36 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 334-365; E Jackson, “Abortion, autonomy and prenatal diagnosis” (2000) 9 Social and 
Legal Studies 467-494. 
24 Scottish Abortion Care Providers Network, “Early Medical Abortion at home”, i. 
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without limitation as to specific features, subject always to the respondents requiring to meet 
the administrative law tenets of reasonableness and rationality.25 
This shows considerable deference to the Government’s argument.26 However, the exercise of any 
decision-making powers must be restricted by the purpose of the enabling Act.. It is therefore 
unfortunate that both parties excluded reference to Hansard with respect to the parliamentary 
intention of both the 1967 and 1990 Acts. This was a significant mistake by the petitioner. As we have 
shown elsewhere, there was detailed parliamentary discussion of whether the section 1(3A) powers 
delegated by the 1990 Act would or could be used to allow home abortions and the then Secretary of 
State for Health, Kenneth Clarke, gave assurances in the negative.27 
Lady Wise concluded her discussion of this submission by introducing a new test, which the petitioners 
failed to satisfy:  
it would be necessary to explain or offer to prove why an outpatient clinic or GP’s premises 
would necessarily be a safer place to take a tablet or pessary as the second stage of a 
pregnancy termination treatment than the woman’s home[.]28  
This test is problematic: it lacks clarity, its relationship to that of suitability is unclear, and it reveals 
the difficulty caused by the scant discussion of the medical process during proceedings. Lady Wise’s 
examples are also self-defeating: neither outpatient clinics nor GP’s surgeries are approved classes of 
place under section 1(3) and therefore could only be used for abortion treatment legally where they 
had been assessed and approved as a specific licensed premise by the Executive under section 1(3). It 
would be interesting to see whether a future appeal or challenge would address this test.  
(2) Treatment by a registered medical practitioner 
The petitioners argued that self-administering misoprostol at home without direct medical supervision 
is inconsistent with treatment by a registered medical practitioner, as required by section 1(1) of the 
1967 Act. 
Lady Wise held, with respect to wider medical practice, that “patients who self-administer medication 
at home may still be described as being treated by their medical practitioner” even if outwith their 
direct supervision, as in cases of diabetes.29 This comparison is questionable, as there was little 
contemplation in the proceedings of the complexities of self-administration of the abortion 
medication. For example, misoprostol tablets can be taken orally during the first seven weeks of 
pregnancy. Thereafter multiple tablets are required to dissolve in the cheek or under the tongue for 
30 minutes, or be inserted vaginally (which is the traditional method, according to the Guidance), and 
may require repeat doses.30 
Because the patient can already self-administer misoprostol in the clinic setting, Lady Wise stated that 
“the extension of the place at which that self-administration can be carried out, from a clinic to home, 
does not offend the requirement that treatment be carried out by a registered medical practitioner”.31  
                                                          
25 SPUC para 33. 
26 Ibid para 20. 
27 Taylor & Wilson (fn 9). 
28 SPUC para 43. 
29 Ibid para 40. 
30 National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, “British National Formulary: Misoprostol”, available at 
https://bnf.nice.org.uk/drug/misoprostol.html. 
31 Ibid. 
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She justifies this on the basis that the House of Lords in Royal College of Nursing had adopted a 
purposive approach to interpretation of the 1967 Act in light of intervening medical advancements 
and, likewise, that “[t]he nature of that control [by the doctor] has necessarily evolved as the 
treatment for the termination of pregnancy has developed.”32 However, this justification is 
problematic. That earlier case arose because a distinct treatment process had emerged which had not 
been contemplated in 1967. The purposive approach allowed the new treatment to be adopted in a 
practical manner. However, the same justification for judicial reinterpretation does not apply in the 
present circumstances. Section 1(3A) was introduced in 1990 in direct contemplation of medical 
abortion by pharmaceutical intervention becoming available. The nature of the treatment under 
current discussion remains the same. This was even conceded by the Government in their 
submissions.33  
Some of Lady Wise’s conclusions might have implications for wider health care practice. In Royal 
College of Nursing, the House of Lords acknowledged that abortion requires a treatment team. Lady 
Wise extends the concept of the treatment team to include the patient: in taking the tablet at the 
doctor’s instruction, “the pregnant woman herself requires to be an active participant in [the team].”34 
The doctor need only know the woman’s location while self-administering (namely her home) to 
remain in control.35 In the abortion context, this role, coupled with her role in the suitability test, gives 
the patient a greater burden of responsibility and control over determinative factors within her 
treatment. This constitutes a significant shift from the situation contemplated by the 1967 Act, and 
misinterprets the concept of patient autonomy. Further, if extended to other treatments, as suggested 
by Lady Wise’s comparative examples mentioned above, this is a change in healthcare law which may 
affect some of the medical team’s traditional civil liability and reduce patients’ recourse against the 
other team members. 
Finally, Lady Wise construes section 1(1) of the 1967 Act “as permitting the second stage of 
pharmaceutical termination to take place in the pregnant woman’s home (where she so wants) with 
self-administration of misoprostol.”36 This is significant because Lady Wise implies that a purposive 
reinterpretation of the 1967 Act would allow home abortion irrespective of any Approval.  
(3) Additional problems arising from the points made 
The case can further be criticised for failing fully to explore certain key issues. 
First, the parties and Lady Wise accepted that the Approval was an instrument recording an executive 
decision rather than delegated legislation.37 Lady Wise also concluded, going further than the parties’ 
statutory construction, that the Scottish Ministers had received their section 1(3A) powers in the 
Scotland Act 1998.38 We have shown elsewhere that both of these conclusions are incorrect. The 
Approval can only be understood as delegated legislation and section 1(3A) as a Henry VIII clause. 
Moreover, section 1(3A) was explicitly not conferred in the 1998 Act but rather only entered Scottish 
competence by default when the Scotland Act 2016 made abortion a devolved matter.39 
                                                          
32 Ibid para 40. 
33 Ibid para 17. 
34 Ibid para 40. 
35 Ibid para 41. 
36 Ibid para 41. 
37 Ibid para 4.  
38 Ibid paras 16, 29. 
39 Taylor & Wilson (fn 9). 
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Secondly, the parties and Lady Wise accepted that the Approval authorised self-administration. 
However, the Approval mentions only that the woman “wants to carry out the treatment at home”. It 
neither explicitly allows self-administration nor excludes the need for medical supervision. A strict 
reading might suggest that medical personnel would need to attend the home at the point of 
administration of misoprostol. It is only the Guidance which, in interpreting the Approval, presumes 
self-administration.  
Thirdly, Lady Wise expressed frustration that the Guidance was not brought within her contemplation. 
Indeed, the Guidance must be regarded as unlawful. It exceeds the Approval in several respects: the 
assumption of self-administration, introduction of a requirement that a second person be present in 
the home at the time of self-administration, and limitation of this treatment option to nine weeks and 
six days of gestation. Additionally, the Guidance does not direct the doctor to determine whether the 
patient wants to self-administer misoprostol at home, which is the test required in the Approval and 
the determining factor in Lady Wise’s test for suitability, but only that the woman “wishes to pass the 
pregnancy at home”. The petitioner’s failure to bring this Guidance within judicial contemplation was 
thus undoubtedly an error, one that undermined their wider case. For example, Lady Wise had 
concerns as to whether a home was necessarily less suitable than a GP’s office. Yet the petitioner, 
with reference to the Guidance, could have argued that the Chief Medical Officer’s requirement that 
a second adult be present demonstrates that the situation contemplated by the Approval is unsafe. 
The Guidance could still be challenged in a separate action, perhaps brought by a woman who would 
be denied treatment under the Guidance but not under the Approval.  
 
D. CONCLUSION 
It is argued that this case was wrongly decided. Lady Wise demonstrates excessive deference to the 
Government’s arguments and goes beyond the points raised.  
More concerning still is the unconsidered suite of difficulties raised by the Approval and Guidance with 
respect to the criminal liability of those involved. A woman’s failure to administer the medication at 
home (but, say, in another location) would put her beyond the protection from criminal prosecution 
offered by the 1967 Act as amended by the Approval. Given the inaccessibility of both the Approval 
and Guidance, the woman’s sole recourse to this important information is through the doctor. The 
doctor is therefore in the position of advising the woman not just medically but also legally in relation 
to her criminal liability. Setting aside the fact that this advisory role is not made clear in the Guidance, 
this is beyond a doctor’s professional capacity and dramatically reframes the doctor-patient 
relationship. It seems unlikely too that medical professional indemnity insurance would cover the 
situation where a doctor failed to give proper legal advice to a patient who was then held criminally 
liable for their implementation of a treatment programme. That there is no mention whatsoever of 
this issue in the Guidance suggests that patients are receiving no information on this, and risk 
unknowingly being made criminally liable. 
